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ABSTRACT 
 
The UK’s referendum decision of 23 June 2016, where voters elected to leave the 
European Union (EU), will fundamentally change aspects of national law. Much debate 
has focused on the constitutional implications of the decision and the procedure by 
which the government seeks to facilitate the exit. Further, issues of substance including 
the part played by immigration and the control of the UK’s borders have also 
dominated legal and political commentary. Yet there has been no critical examination 
of the effects it will have on motor vehicle insurance law. The statute governing much 
of the law (the Road Traffic Act 1988), along with the extra-statutory agreements 
providing protection for the third party victims of negligent uninsured drivers and 
untraced vehicles, are each profoundly influenced by EU directives. Given the Brexit 
decision and the resolution of the government to facilitate the UK’s exit of the Union, 
we argue that the protective rights for such victims of motor accidents are likely to be 
reduced. Further, the advancement of the law, developed through the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice, will be lost.      
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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The law relating to motor vehicle insurance is subject to governance from both national 
and EU law. Nationally, and at a statutory level, the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88) 
regulates (inter alia) much of the requirements relating to compulsory third-party 
insurance. This requires that motor vehicles used on a road or other public place1 are 
subject to a minimum of compulsory insurance to protect third party victims of a 
negligent driver. In the event that the victim suffers damage and/or loss due to the 
actions of an uninsured driver or an untraced vehicle, extra-statutory arrangements2 
(established between the Secretary of State for Transport and the Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau (MIB)) take effect.  
 
Since 1972 the EU has issued six directives on motor vehicle insurance law with the 
aim, initially, of facilitating the free movement of goods, services and people through 
a system of comparable minimum standards for motor insurance. Collectively they 
create a legal framework for ensuring that individuals injured by motor vehicles 
registered anywhere in the EU are guaranteed compensation and receive comparable 
treatment.3 As outlined in the first motor vehicle insurance directive (MVID), member 
states were to “ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based 
in its territory is covered by insurance.”4 There were problems inherent in the use of 
                                                        
1 RTA88 s.143. 
2 The Uninsured Drivers Agreement (UDA) 2015 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement (UtDA) 2003 (as 
amended). 
3 As underlined in the recitals to the first and second MVID. 
4 Art. 3(1) (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to 
the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ L103/1. 
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broad terminology in the first MVID and specifically in its reference to “civil liability… 
covered by insurance.” Such an inclusion provided member states with significant 
discretion in its implementation in national law and led to a series of (permissible) 
exclusions being applied. For example, exclusions of liability to passengers;5 family 
members;6 third party cover in the event of the driver being intoxicated;7  and the 
insurance requirements applied to the seating area of vehicles8 were each included in 
the national law of some member states. Subsequent MVIDs9 removed some of the 
worst offending aspects of the first directive, as did the activism of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU).    
 
The second MVID extended the protection afforded to the victims of motor vehicle 
accidents by requiring member states to establish a national compensatory guarantee 
scheme tasked with providing compensation to the victims of uninsured drivers and 
                                                        
5 See McMinn v McMinn and anr. [2005] EWHC 827 (QB) in reference to liability under the RTA88 (s. 
151(4)) and Akers v Motor Insurers Bureau [2003] EWCA Civ 18 with reference to liability under the 
MIB agreements. 
6 See Case C-348/98 Vitor Manuel Mendes Ferreira and Maria Clara Delgado Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:442. 
7 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
8 See Case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty [2007] ECR I-3067. 
9 For instance the Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17 
in Art. 2(1) resulted in specific exclusions of liability being held as void as against a third party claimant. 
This was a significant advancement as demonstrated in its application in Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz 
Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
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untraced vehicles.10 Further, it imposed restrictions on member states’ discretion to 
permit contractual exclusion clauses or restrictions of liability. Here member states 
were required to ensure third-party motor vehicle insurance covered property damage 
and personal injury, it removed the ability of insurance policies to exclude members of 
the driver's family from third-party cover, and it imposed minimum amounts in 
compensation for property and personal injury claims. The third MVID11 sought to 
remove the uncertainty as to the geographic scope of insurance policies as articulated 
in the first MVID,12  thereby removing the existing disparities between the law of 
member states. It also introduced the concept of mandatory protection to cover all 
passengers. The aim was to provide “a high level of consumer protection” – hence 
viewing individuals in the member states not only in terms of them being potential 
accident victims but also as consumers purchasing insurance cover as required by EU 
law. The fourth MVID13 required the creation of national information centres with 
responsibility for maintaining relevant information on motor vehicles, insurance 
policies, the green card scheme and so on. The fifth MVID 14  offered revisions to 
minimum compensation levels and the identification of cyclists and pedestrians as 
                                                        
10 At Art. 1.4 Council Directive 84/5/EEC. 
11 (The) Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1990] OJ L129/33. 
12 At Art. 3 Council Directive 72/166/EEC. 
13 Directive 2000/26/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council Directives 
73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (the Fourth Motor Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65. 
14 (The Fifth Directive) Directive 2005/14/EC amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 
88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [2005] OJ L149/14. 
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special categories of accident victims who, along with other non-motorised road users, 
were to be included in the coverage of all insurance policies. Most recently, the sixth 
MVID 15  was introduced and consolidated the previous five MVIDs. Further, it 
abolished boarder checks on insurance, requires all motor vehicles in the EU to be 
covered by third party insurance, prescribes minimum third party liability insurance 
cover, and provides for the prompt settlement of claims arising from accidents 
occurring outside of the victim’s country of residence. 
 
As such, the MVIDs place significant obligations on member states in terms of the 
provision of motor vehicle insurance to be regulated in their jurisdiction. It does not, 
however, cover all aspects of motor insurance. It places no obligations on 
‘comprehensive’ motor policies (focusing instead on third party/liability cover), 
matters of civil liability and the calculation of compensation awards are determined in 
accordance with national law, and other significant issues are also out of scope, for 
example problems associated with the insolvency of an insurer,16 are subject to national 
law, not the law and jurisprudence of the EU. 
 
2. BREXIT MEANS BREXIT 
                                                        
15 (The Sixth Directive) Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of 
the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] 
OJ L263/11. 
16 For instance, in Case C-409/11 Csonka v Magyar Allam [2013] EUECJ (11 July 2013), a claimant 
failed to recover compensation from the guarantee fund of Hungary where the negligent driver’s insurers 
became insolvent (although in the UK such an instance would enable the claimant to recover from the 
Financial Conduct Authority). 
 6 
 
The certainty of the law on motor vehicle insurance, and the relationship between UK 
and EU law will be fundamentally affected by the referendum decision of 23 June 2016. 
The British exit of the EU (commonly referred to as Brexit) was announced on 24 June 
and has already led to numerous issues affecting the future legal and political 
relationship between the UK and the EU. It is trite comment, but this unprecedented 
step means that there will be no new EU laws to be transposed and interpreted, no 
references made by national courts to the CJEU,17 no discussions needed as to the 
compatibility between the two sources, no enforcement mechanisms compelling 
damages payments for the consequences of the UK’s breach of its obligations,18 and no 
requirements for national law to comply with fundamental principles of EU law.19 Of 
course, until the UK triggers the official exit mechanism and formally leaves, EU law 
including the MVIDs, applies to national law in its application and its (broad) 
                                                        
17 Via Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). 
18 Either at a national level through a claim of state liability (non-contractual tortious liability); or at an 
EU level through the Commission’s action against the member state for failure to fulfill an obligation 
under the Treaties (Article 258 TFEU). 
19 Such as ensuring equivalence and effectiveness of national law with EU law. 
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interpretation.20 As such, the areas in which the UK is in breach21 of the MVIDs must 
still be remedied and the UK continues to be subject to enforcement actions at both EU 
and national levels for any failures to correctly transpose and apply the law. 
 
Following the appointment of Teresa May to the position of Prime Minister in July 
2016, she has continued to issue the mantra of ‘Brexit means Brexit’ when referring to 
comments on her position regarding the intention of the government to exit the EU. 
During her premiership May has insisted that the will of the electorate has to be 
respected and that an exit of the EU is the intention of the government. However, she 
has also cautioned that the exit negotiations are not to be rushed and the details will not 
be determined until the government’s objectives are clear. One of the key issues that 
will define the scope and content of those negotiations with the EU will be the 
restriction of immigration, indeed it has been referred to as a “red line” in any 
                                                        
20 Per Sir Andrew Morrit C’s judgment in Vodaphone 2 v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] 
EWCA Civ 446 at [37]: “In summary, the obligation on the English courts to construe domestic 
legislation consistently with Community law obligations is both broad and far-reaching. In particular: 
(a) It is not constrained by conventional rules of construction; (b) It does not require ambiguity in the 
legislative language; (c) It is not an exercise in semantics or linguistics; (d) It permits departure from the 
strict and literal application of the words which the legislature has elected to use; (e) It permits the 
implication of words necessary to comply with Community law obligations; and (f) The precise form of 
the words to be implied does not matter.” 
21 For examples of breaches of the extra-statutory Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement see James Marson and 
Katy Ferris “The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 as a Legitimate Source of Authority” (2016) 
Statute Law Review DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmw043. 
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negotiated deal.22 Yet, important questions remain unanswered in the announcements 
since the referendum result and despite the government’s white paper23 published 2 
February 2017. There is little detail on the basis on which the UK’s withdrawal 
negotiations will take place;24 the level of accountability those negotiating the deal will 
have to the electorate and Parliament; the deal which the UK is seeking (and the one 
which it will accept); and what the precise implications will be, following Brexit, for 
individuals (and citizens of the EU) living here and abroad,25 and also for the businesses 
whose trade is dependent upon access to the Single Market. 
                                                        
22  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/31/restricting-immigration-will-be-at-heart-of-
brexit-deal-theresa-may-says (accessed 2 October 2016). 
23 HM Government “The United Kingdom’s Exit from and New Partnership with the European Union” 
(2017) Cm 9417. 
24 It is also worth remembering that the terms of Brexit must be agreed with by the other 27 member 
states of the EU. This mechanism is not designed simply to allow a member state to unilaterally decide 
to leave and on which terms it wishes to continue any relationship. 
25 At present the government’s position appears to be no more strategic than “tit for tat” arguments 
regarding reciprocal arrangements with the EU and individual states. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/28/theresa-may-on-brexit-tour-of-eastern-europe 
(accessed 4 October 2016). Further, on 7 October 2016, The Telegraph reported that the Home Office 
(after discovering five in six EU nationals currently living in the UK could not be legally deported) will, 
prior to the UK’s withdrawal, issue 80% of the 3.6 million EU citizens living in the UK with permanent 
residency rights. The remaining 600,000 individuals will be offered “amnesty” to remain. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/07/every-eu-migrant-can-stay-after-brexit-600000-will-be-
given-amne/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter (accessed 8 October 2016). This is reiterated in 
the white paper (n 23) where at para. 6.4, p. 30 “The UK remains ready to give people the certainty they 
want and reach a reciprocal deal with our European partners at the earliest opportunity. It is the right and 
fair thing to do.” 
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On 2 October 2016 the Prime Minister announced at the Conservative conference in 
Brighton that a “Great Repeal Bill” will lead to the formal repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972.26 Further, and in the face of questions regarding the uncertainty 
with which this leaves the country, three further details were added in her speech. The 
first was that the Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) procedure will be 
triggered by the end of March 201727 (and will therefore pre-empt the passage through 
Parliament of the Great Repeal Bill).28 Secondly, all present EU-based29 or inspired 
laws will become national law and hence will remain unless and until they are formally 
withdrawn according to reviews undertaken by the relevant Secretary of State30 (but 
will lead to the loss of the primacy of EU-based law). And thirdly, of particular interest 
in relation to the future of the UK’s relationship with the EU, the Prime Minister 
remarked that the CJEU will no longer have jurisdiction in relation to legal issues 
                                                        
26 The Bill will replace the European Communities Act 1972 but its commencement date will be on 
“Brexit day”. 
27 “There will be no unnecessary delays in invoking Article 50. We will invoke it when we are ready. 
And we will be ready soon. We will invoke Article 50 no later than the end of March next year.” 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37532364 (accessed 2 October 2016). 
28 Likely to be announced in the Queen’s speech in May 2017. 
29 Which, interestingly, conflates Directives and Regulations (a distinction which has led to considerable 
debate and analysis in academic literature and judicial pronouncements). 
30 The Prime Minister announced on 17 January 2017 that such legislation will only be changed following 
“full scrutiny and proper Parliamentary debate,” yet a commitment to the creation of a full Act of 
Parliament is missing. It is quite possible that Statutory Instruments, and the limitations for Parliamentary 
interventions such instruments allow, will be the mechanism selected to facilitate reviews of this source 
of law. 
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arising in the UK. This, along with a requirement that the UK once again has the power 
to control immigration (and therefore restrict one of the central pillars of the European 
project – the free movement of people) in practical terms suggests the UK will pursue 
a “hard Brexit”, leaving the UK without a formal relationship with the EU and outside 
of the Single Market.31 This is, of course, as yet uncertain as the negotiations of the 
UK’s withdrawal have not started. What is clear, is that these aspirations suggest that a 
prolonged period of negotiation is inevitable if both the UK and the EU do wish to 
continue some post-Brexit relationship.   
 
The mechanism of triggering the Brexit procedure and the legal route required to be 
taken were immediate questions to be addressed. Initially, the government had insisted 
it held a prerogative power to invoke Art. 50 TEU without the consent of Parliament.32 
Arguments were soon presented that, in the absence of legislative action in the first 
instance, this position may be constitutionally unsound. Prerogative powers cannot be 
used to change UK statute33 as, whilst the royal prerogative may be used to create and 
                                                        
31 The point being reiterated in the white paper (n 23) where the fifth of the 12 principles which will 
guide the government in exiting the EU is ‘controlling immigration’ (pp. 5, 7 and 25-). Further, at para 
5.4 the Government “will design our immigration system to ensure that we are able to control the 
numbers of people who come here from the EU. In future, therefore, the Free Movement Directive 
[Directive 2004/38/EC] will no longer apply and the migration of EU nationals will be subject to UK 
law. ” (p. 25). This suggests a future agreement where the UK remains part of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) is ruled out. 
32  The government’s view was the conduct of foreign relations, which included accession to and 
withdrawal from international treaties, was a matter falling within its prerogative. 
33 R (On The Application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] 
UKHL 61 at [44]. 
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accede to treaties, it may not be used to alter the law or to remove rights to which 
individuals enjoy in domestic law (in the absence of parliamentary intervention).34 In 
R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,35 the Supreme Court 
was required to identify whether an Act of Parliament was required prior to the 
government triggering Art. 50 TEU and whether the devolved governments could 
prevent Brexit. In answering these questions the Supreme Court (by a majority 8-3) has 
clarified the need for an Act of Parliament to enable the triggering of Art. 50 TEU. 
Consequently, on 26 January 2017 the government tabled its Brexit Bill.36  Whilst 
brief,37 the Bill is progressing through the House of Commons prior to being debated 
by the House of Lords.38 Further, the Supreme Court held (unanimously) that the 
government did not have to seek permission from the devolved governments prior to 
triggering Art. 50 TEU. It did not address the issue of the constitutional convention 
(known as the Sewel Convention)39 whereby changes to the powers of a devolved 
                                                        
34 See Lord Oliver comments, JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 
2 AC 418 at [499F-500C]. 
35 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
36 The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill. 
37 The Bill, brief at merely 133 words and allocating five days of debate, has already created controversy 
and may lead to further legal challenge even beyond the triggering of Art. 50 TEU. It is a “Bill to confer 
power on the Prime Minister to notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United 
Kingdom's intention to withdraw from the EU.” 
38 It is anticipated that the Bill will finish its passage through the House of Lords by 7 March 2017. A 
European Council meeting takes place two days later where it is possible the UK will formally invoke 
Art. 50 TEU. 
39 Despite the inclusion and acknowledgement of the Sewel Convention in the Scotland Act 2016, this 
did not elevate its status to that of law. It remains a political convention and thus not a matter for the 
Court. 
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institution require its consent prior to the enactment of such legislative measures. This 
was a matter to be determined within the political world and the Supreme Court was 
“neither the parents nor the guardians of political conventions; they are merely 
observers.”40 
 
The uniqueness of a member state leaving the EU through it invoking a Treaty Article 
poses interesting questions for the UK. Article 50 TEU is the lex specialis for member 
states to withdraw from the EU. It is also considered preferable to Art. 48 TEU as it 
merely requires a qualified majority decision of the 27 member states rather than the 
vote of unanimity required by that provision.41 As a matter of public international law,42 
Art. 54 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969 would also enable exit.43 
However, the Vienna Convention is of more interest in relation to the aftermath of the 
triggering of the Art. 50 TEU mechanism. Whilst Art. 50 TEU is silent on the matter 
of whether the application for withdrawal may be reversed (revoking the application), 
the Vienna Convention allows for such action unless this is specifically denied. The 
“point of no return” occurs two years’ after the notification under Art. 50 TEU and 
therefore it may be possible for further challenges to the process and terms of the UK’s 
                                                        
40 at para [146]. 
41 Article 48 TEU allows for the changing of the treaties and could be used to alter existing treaties to 
remove the UK from their scope. 
42 Reliance on principles of international law would seem contrary to the sui generis legal orthodoxy of 
EU law. 
43  Art. 54 allows for the withdrawal, by a party to an international treaty, on satisfaction that the 
withdrawal is in conformity with the terms of the particular treaty or at any time with the consent of the 
other parties (e.g. member states). Given the existence of Art. 50 TEU, this route would now be very 
unlikely and unnecessary. 
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withdrawal. Hence, the Supreme Court decision remains, of course, highly significant 
but it should not necessarily be seen as an end to legal proceedings on Brexit. 
 
Art. 50 TEU envisages that once a declaration is formally made, the process of 
withdrawal will take up to a period of two-years to complete.44 It is quite possible that 
this time period could be extended given the short time frame of two-years, the 
complexity of any future relationship between the UK and EU,45 and the current lack 
of pre-Art. 50 TEU negotiations with the EU. The time frame is designed to facilitate 
the conclusion of a new arrangement for the (leaving) member state to continue a 
relationship with the EU. The UK’s position is that it will leave the EU, but wishes to 
continue a trading relationship and also to have access to the Single Market,46 yet not 
to be a member of it.47 This position was confirmed by the Prime Minister in her Brexit 
                                                        
44 Art. 50(3) TEU. 
45 For instance, in the Prime Minister’s Brexit speech 17 January 2017, she indicated the UK wishes for 
a bespoke deal with access to the customs union and comprehensive free trade, but without the necessity 
of membership of the EU. 
46 As identified by the Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson and Ian Mitchell ‘The EU Single Market: The 
Value of Membership Versus Access to the UK’ (2016) Institute for Fiscal Studies Report R119, 10 
August: “Maintaining membership of the Single Market as part of the EEA could be worth potentially 
4% on GDP – adding almost two years of trend GDP growth – relative to World Trade Organization 
(WTO) membership alone.” https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8411 (accessed 4 October 2016). 
47 As reported on 29 September 2016, the International Trade Secretary Liam Fox announced that he 
wants Britain to become a full independent member of the WTO. In the article he is paraphrased as 
remarking “Britain is instead expected to pursue a deal which will ‘maximise access’ to the Single Market 
while retaining the ability to make free trade deals.” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/29/liam-
fox-signals-britain-will-leave-the-single-market-in-hard-br/ (accessed 4 October 2016). Ultimately, the 
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speech issued on 17 January 2017.48 Whether such an agreement can be made on these 
terms remains questionable. For instance, the UK could attempt to conclude a future 
agreement on the basis of a European Free Trade Association 49  (EFTA) model.50 
Membership of the EFTA removes the requirement to follow rulings of the CJEU 
(delivered after 1991), yet it would be subject to the EFTA Court (albeit this court often 
produces rulings of a non-binding nature and its jurisdiction is significantly smaller 
than that of the CJEU). Alternative mechanisms to continue a relationship with the EU 
has included associate membership or as a customs union,51 as a member of the World 
Trade Organization52 or via a free trade arrangement and so on.53 Brexit appears to lead 
                                                        
greater the access that non-member states have to the EU, the more they must adhere to market rules and 
the greater the financial contribution expected of them. 
48 The UK will not seek to remain a member of the Single Market but will seek a free-trade deal with the 
EU, and the legal jurisdiction of the CJEU over the UK will end 
49 Which has four member countries – Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
50 Which would allow participation in the single market (not, however, with regards the Common 
Agricultural and the Fisheries Policies) but do so based on the application of the fundamental freedoms 
of EU law. It would require a continued, albeit reduced, financial contribution to the EU budget but 
without the contribution to the formation of EU law, and it would release the UK from the direct scope 
of CJEU rulings, but this may be a pyrrhic victory as the EFTA Court follows the CJEU. 
51 Which would allow very limited access to the single market, but would mean no financial contribution 
to the EU budget, no requirement to apply the fundamental freedoms of EU law, not being subject to 
CJEU rulings, and no contribution to the formation and conclusion of future EU law. 
52 Which would allow no direct access to the single market, would mean no financial contribution to the 
EU budget, no requirement to apply the fundamental freedoms of EU law, not being subject to CJEU 
rulings, and no contribution to the formation and conclusion of future EU law. 
53 Such by concluding a relationship based on an EFTA and bilateral trade agreement (per Switzerland), 
a WTO and Free Trade Agreement etc. 
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the way for a separation of EU law from national law. Those favourable to the idea of 
the UK remaining a trading partner with the EU may have hoped for a “soft Brexit” 
with its light-touch of EU law, although it is questionable whether this would appease 
the majority of voters who wished for the UK to exit the EU. Given the recent 
statements by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, and in 
particular the hard line the UK is adopting in seeking full control over immigration and 
associated policies (as per the Government’s white paper),54 it appears unlikely that 
such an agreement can be concluded on these terms. Consequently, the analysis in this 
article is taken from the perspective of a hard Brexit and the implications this will have 
on the RTA88. Beyond the detail of the MVIDs and their effect on the RTA88, the 
application of key principles of EU law, including equivalence and effectiveness, 
appear in jeopardy. 
 
3. BREXIT: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR RTA88 
 
The interaction between national law and EU law, and the decades of case law that have 
developed within this relationship, is based on a system of the UK’s surrendered 
sovereignty in specific areas of EU competence, and the primacy of EU law over 
inconsistent national provisions. The MVIDs have sought to harmonise minimum 
standards for motor insurance across the member states and in so doing have 
significantly increased the protection of third party victims of motor vehicle accidents,55 
                                                        
54 n 23. 
55 See, for instance, Byrne (A Minor) v The Motor Insurers Bureau and the Secretary of State for 
Transport [2008] EWCA Civ 574 where the national law restricted the rights of a child victim of an 
untraced driver by requiring that a claim for compensation through the MIB had to be made within three 
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whilst simplifying the process of claims and making the awards of compensation 
consistent.56 
 
If we begin by assuming that the UK will simply withdraw from the EU and leave the 
Single Market, thereby not being bound by EU law, the UK will be free of the 
interference of the CJEU and will no longer have to transpose future MVIDs or give 
effect to the existing MVIDs (save for those elements already transposed into national 
law after “Brexit day”). Thereafter, the UK will revert to the scope and national 
mechanisms of statutory construction in RTA88 without the need for interpretation with 
the MVIDs57 or guidance from the jurisprudence of the CJEU. This would simplify the 
process of interpreting national law in this area (including both the extra-statutory and 
statutory provisions), but would not create, in the medium-term at least,58 any clarity, 
                                                        
years of the accident. For the victims of a traced driver (and hence a claim against the tortfeasor or his 
insurers), the period for the lodging of the claim did not begin until the child reached majority. The Court 
of Appeal changed the law to remove this defect by applying the requirements in the MVID. 
56 See Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2016] UKSC 52. 
57 Or indeed, unless enacted and with a transposition date within this time-frame, a potential seventh 
MVID - On 8 June 2016, the European Commission published its “Inception Impact Assessment” 
proposing the “adaptation of the scope of Directive 2009/103/EC on motor insurance.” This will possibly 
lead to the European Parliament enacting a (seventh) directive to amend the sixth MVID. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_fisma_030_motor_insurance_en.pdf 
(accessed 5 October 2016). 
58 In February 2016, the government presented a report to Parliament “The process for withdrawing from 
the European Union” Cm 9216 where it concluded that withdrawal from the EU could “… lead to up to 
a decade or more of uncertainty.” (para 2.9). 
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or roadmap to legal certainty without express direction as to the foundations of judicial 
interpretation to be applied in the post-Brexit era.59  
 
History has demonstrated that courts in the UK have often been reluctant to provide a 
purposive and broad interpretation of national law to ensure compliance with the 
MVIDs. In Clarke v Kato and Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Ltd60 the House of Lords 
was charged with interpreting s. 192 RTA88. Section 192 provides the definition of 
“road” as “any highway and any other road to which the public has access.” This was 
pertinent as the cases involved injuries sustained by the claimants caused by motor 
vehicles in car parks. The claimants argued that in providing an interpretation of s. 192 
consistent with the MVIDs required the courts to extend the meaning of the word “road” 
to include a car park. The Lords unanimously refused. Lord Clyde, providing the only 
judgment, held it was theoretically possible to offer a consistent interpretation of the 
RTA88 with the MVID but chose not to.61 However, following intervention by the 
European Commission, despite this judgment, the Department for Transport was 
required to enact the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 2000 No. 
726 to broaden the meaning of the word road by adding “or other public place.”62 
Further, in White v White & MIB63 the Lords, whilst ultimately providing a purposive 
                                                        
59 Indeed, it may be necessary, via the branch of the civil service dedicated to facilitating Brexit, for a 
new method of statutory interpretation to be developed to aid with consistency and determinacy.  
60 Clarke v Kato and Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Ltd [1988] All ER (D) 481. 
61 Largely because the distinction between a road and a car park, reflected as it is in the ordinary use of 
words, was reinforced when considered in light of the language of the RTA88. To provide a consistent 
interpretation with the MVID would have meant a strained construction of the Act. 
62 This change had practical effects for the geographic scope of ss. 143, 145, 146, 165 and 170 RTA88. 
63 White v White & MIB [2001] UKHL 9. 
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interpretation of the (extra-statutory) Uninsured Drivers Agreement (UDA), argued that 
as the UDA was established between the Secretary of State and the MIB (a private 
company), this was nothing more than a private law agreement and hence was not 
susceptible to a Marleasing-compliant64 interpretation. These cases are presented as 
examples of the national courts adopting a narrow and restrictive application of statutes 
which seek to protect vulnerable third party victims of motor vehicle accidents. The 
judiciary had the benefit of guidance from the CJEU (through the reference procedure) 
to assist them achieve a consistent application of EU law, yet decided against this. Even 
when theorizing whether a broader application of national law to comply with an EU 
law with primacy should be adopted, in each aspect the judiciary decided, rather, to 
provide a very restrictive and literal interpretation.65 The EU has developed the MVIDs 
to offer increased protection to third party victims and this is reflected also in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU. On the contrary, even though the victims in the cases above 
                                                        
64 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECJ. 
65 Most recently, the Court of Appeal was charged with interpreting ss. 145, 143(1)(a) and 143(1)(b) 
RTA88 in respect of a third party victim of an insured driver who, argued the claimant, had “caused or 
permitted” an unidentified and uninsured driver to use a motor vehicle. In Sahin v Havard and Riverstone 
Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202 the Court of Appeal disregarded EU jurisprudence and a 
national decision held weeks before its judgment (Allen v Mohammed and Allianz Insurance (2016), 
Lawtel, LTL 25/10/2016) to erroneously (we argue) provide a restrictive interpretation of the RTA88. 
The second MVID provided the required protection to the claimant and it is likely a case to the Supreme 
Court will be made to ensure the correct purposive interpretation of the RTA88 is provided. For 
commentary on the case see James Marson and Katy Ferris “Misunderstanding and Misapplication of 
Motor Insurance Law. Will the Supreme Court come to the Rescue?” (2017) European Journal of Current 
Legal Issues (forthcoming). 
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were seeking compensation and had a route available to them through EU directives, 
the national judiciary decided against applying the law consistently.  
 
With regards to the current interpretation and scope of the RTA88, ss. 143,66 145,67 
148,68 150,69 151(4),70 152,71 185,72 and 19273 are at present in breach of EU law. How 
will Brexit affect the future of these transgressions? 
 
Section 143 is a requirement for insurance against third-party risks and that such 
insurance must comply with minimum standards. At s. 143(1)(a) this requires that “a 
person must not use a motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] unless there is in 
force… such a policy of insurance… as complies with the requirements of this part of 
the Act.”74 As noted above, whilst this part of the RTA88 was extended to include 
vehicles on a road or other public place, the use of the term “public” is problematic 
                                                        
66 The duty to insure. This section of the RTA88 breaches Arts. 1 and 3 of the sixth MVID. 
67 The requirement of third party insurance cover. This section of the RTA88 breaches Arts. 1 and 3 of 
the sixth MVID. 
68 Limitations on certain exclusions within the holder’s insurance policy. This section of the RTA88 
breaches Art. 3 of the sixth MVID. 
69 The private use of a vehicle. This section of the RTA88 breaches Arts. 3 and 12(1) of the sixth MVID. 
70 The (constructive) knowledge of theft or unlawful taking. This section of the RTA88 breaches Art. 
13.1 of the sixth MVID. 
71 Exceptions to indemnity under s. 151. This section of the RTA88 breaches recital 15 of the sixth 
MVID. 
72 The definition of a motor vehicle. This section of the RTA88 breaches Arts. 1 and 3 of the sixth MVID. 
73 The definition of road or other public place. This section of the RTA88 breaches Arts. 1 and 3 of the 
sixth MVID. 
74 Similar requirements are placed on authorised insurers at s. 145 RTA88. 
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with regards to EU law. Essentially, it refers to places where the public can be expected 
to be and to which they have access. Hence, a private road leading to a group of 
buildings, where the public at large would not be invited (although social visitors, 
tradespeople and so on would be) is not within the scope of the section.75 Campsites 
and caravan parks,76 pay and display car parks,77 and even dockyards78 have been held 
to satisfy the definition of a “road”, but the problem exists in relation to the use of the 
word “public” and the inherent restrictions this creates. In the recent case of Vnuk79 the 
CJEU has highlighted the incompatibility between RTA88 s. 143 (and s. 185)80 and the 
MVIDs. Here an individual on a farm in Slovakia was injured by a driver of a tractor 
and trailer. As the vehicle was never taken from the private land on which the farm was 
situated, no insurance policy was held to cover for any accidents associated with this 
vehicle. The CJEU was tasked with identifying whether the MVIDs extended to 
requiring insurance to be held merely for road registered vehicles or to all motor 
vehicles, properly used, regardless of the fact that national law did not require 
compulsory motor insurance to be held. Advocate-General Mengozzi identified the 
MVIDs as seeking to protect individual victims of accidents on public and private land, 
and the CJEU’s judgment confirmed the need for insurance of motor vehicles in such a 
location.81 Yet, the UK still maintains the “black-hole” that currently exists in national 
                                                        
75 Harrison v Hill 1932 JC 13; 1931 SLT 598. 
76 DPP v Vivier [1991] 4 All ER 18. 
77 Montgomery v Loney [1959] NI 171. 
78 Buchanan v MIB [1955] 1 All ER 607. 
79 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] Judgment 4 September. 
80 Which should, following Vnuk, adopt the definition provided in Art. 1 of the sixth MVID. 
81 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav ECLI:EU:C:2014:106 Opinion of Advocate 
General Mengozzi delivered on 26 February 2014 at [43]. 
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motor insurance law as regards the protection of third party victims of non-road 
registered vehicles (such as quad-bikes or vehicles used in purely agricultural, 
construction, industrial, motor sports or fairground activities). There is no 
requirement under the RTA88 for such vehicles to be subject to insurance and therefore 
the third party victim would be unable to claim from a contractual insurer, no statutory 
insurer would exist, and the MIB would also be unwilling to settle the claim. The MIB 
only has a responsibility to act as insurer of last resort in cases of no insurance, but only 
where the vehicle was legally required to be subject to an insurance policy (and 
evidently these classes of vehicle are not so required under the current interpretation of 
national law). 
 
Further, the definition of “motor vehicle” provided in s. 185 is, following the 
implications of Vnuk,82 too restrictive to comply with the MVIDs.83 In interpreting that 
term (and as a result determining the circumstances in which motor vehicle insurance 
is compulsory), a court would revert to the current national interpretation (although at 
the time of writing it would be more accurate to refer to the content of ss. 143 and 185 
as remaining (rather than reverting) due to the continued inaction of the UK and which 
is unacceptable until a formal UK withdrawal from the EU).84 Unless either Parliament 
chooses to change the law, the judiciary hear a case which offers an opportunity to 
                                                        
82 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] Judgment 4 September. 
83 It breaches Arts. 1 and 3 of the sixth MVID. For commentary see Nicholas Bevan “Ignore at your 
Peril” (2014) 164 New Law Journal 7628, 7. 
84 It was expected that changes would be made to the RTA88 before the end of 2016 to comply with the 
implications of the Vnuk ruling (see http://www.ajginternational.com/news-
insights/articles/insights/motor-fleet-insurance/ - accessed 8 October 2016).  
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provide a consistent interpretation (and they take that route), or a successful 
enforcement action is taken against the state by a third party victim, it is more likely 
that the national law in this area will not be changed and a gap in the protection of 
victims will remain. A proposed seventh MVID may be established by the European 
Parliament85 to clarify the implications of the Vnuk86 ruling, but given the time frame 
for the creation and required transposition of directives, it is unlikely to affect the law 
in the UK, although presumably the UK may contribute to the consultation process 
whilst still a member state. 
 
Section 148 RTA88,87 providing the statutory restriction on exclusion clauses in motor 
insurance policies, was subject to interpretation by the Court of Appeal in EUI v Bristol 
Alliance Partnership.88 Here, the driver of a motor vehicle attempted to commit suicide 
by driving his car into a department store and in so doing struck another motorist’s 
vehicle and caused damage to the building.89 The contractual insurance policy included 
a clause excluding the insurer’s liability for any action taken by the driver with the 
intention of causing deliberate damage. As such, the driver was considered to be 
ostensibly uninsured therefore leaving the owner of the building (and of the other 
vehicle) unable to recover its losses from the driver's insurers. Further, the extra-
                                                        
85  http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_fisma_030_motor_insurance_en.pdf 
(accessed 5 October 2016). 
86 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] Judgment 4 September. 
87 Interestingly, there is no equivalent provision to this section of the Act in the Road Traffic (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1981. 
88 [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
89 EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
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statutory protection offered through the UDA 1999 was ineffective as it, at that time, it 
excluded subrogated claims.90 The reason the insurer was permitted to avoid the policy 
was that such an action was not expressly excluded by the RTA88. At s. 148(2) eight 
“matters” 91  (exclusions) are listed, which, if used by an insurer to avoid a 
policyholder’s claim under that policy would be held as void. Therefore, if the insurer’s 
attempt to exclude its liability on the policy was for a reason (or “matter”) included in 
this section of the Act, the insurer would still have to satisfy a third party’s claim for 
damage or loss suffered as a consequence of the accident. The eight “matters” did not 
expressly prevent the use of an exclusion of liability for the consequences of deliberate 
damage and hence the Court of Appeal had to determine whether the list of matters in 
s. 148(2) was illustrative or exhaustive. The Court of Appeal considered the 
compatibility between s. 148(2) and the MVID Art. 5 even though, at an EU level, the 
issue was clear.92 Section 148(2) RTA88, as held by the Court of Appeal, contained an 
exhaustive list and thus the clause prevented the insurers for the damaged building from 
recovering damages from the driver’s insurers. It is difficult to see how this conclusion 
                                                        
90 UDA 1999 cl 6(1)(c)(ii). 
91 The eight matters include the age or physical/mental condition of persons driving the vehicle; the 
condition of the vehicle (for example, a car’s illegally worn (bald) tyres); the number of persons that the 
vehicle carries; the weight/physical characteristics of the goods which the vehicle carries; the time at 
which/areas within which a vehicle is used; the horsepower/cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; the 
carrying on the vehicle of particular apparatus; or the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of 
identification other than that required by law. 
92 At Recital 15 of the sixth MVID it is required that (subject to one exception) an insurer’s liability to 
compensate third-party victims of motor vehicle accidents is and remains independent of the contract 
and any contractual restrictions therein between the insurer and the policyholder.  
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can be justified since consistent case law from the CJEU in Bernaldez,93  Correia 
Ferreira v Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA, 94  Candolin v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola,95 Farrell v Whitty,96 and Churchill v Wilkinson 
and Tracey Evans97 identifies the exclusions as merely illustrative. On the face of it, 
the decision in EUI appears to be wrong, and therefore constitutes a breach of EU law. 
The MVIDs’ permitted exclusions refer to the very restrictive “right” of insurers to 
cancel insurance policies, and ultimately, given the nature of the driver’s actions in EUI 
v Bristol Alliance Partnership,98 whilst motorists are required to ensure that any use of 
motor vehicles is covered by a minimum of third party cover, insurance companies are 
seemingly not required to provide the same. This facilitates the insurers in evading 
liability, it enables insurers to benefit from using the “Article 75 procedure”99 to handle 
                                                        
93 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
94  Case C-348/98 Vitor Manuel Mendes Ferreira and Maria Clara Delgado Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA [2000] ECR 1-6711. 
95  Case C-537/03 Katja Candolin, Jari-Antero Viljaniemi and Veli-Matti Paananen v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhti&ouml Pohjola and Jarno Ruokoranta [2005] ECR I-5745. 
96 Case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty [2007] ECR I-3067.  
97 Case C-442/10 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans v Equity 
Claims Limited [2011] ECR I-00000. 
98 EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
99 Article 75 (of the MIB’s Articles of Association) is an intra-insurer protocol. It applies where the 
insurer asserts it has the right to repudiate or to avoid the contract (such as when the policyholder 
misrepresents facts or fails to disclose). Here the insurer applies to the court for a declaration under 
RTA88 s. 152(2) that the insurance contract is void. It gives effect to third party victims of insufficiently 
insured drivers seeking access to compensation where the contractual insurer becomes a statutorily-
required insurer (standing in place of the MIB). The insurer here operates under the UDA and 
consequently the third party victim suffers from access to poorer terms than would be available through 
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claims on poorer terms for the victim of an accident than would be available through a 
contractual claim, and following Brexit will enable the industry to continue this practice 
without questions of compatibility with a higher source of law being raised. Until 
Brexit, the UK should delete the “matters” from the s. 148(2) RTA88 as their existence 
(wrongly) implies that other exclusions are permitted. 
 
The RTA88 holds that in the unauthorised or non-contractual use of the vehicle, no 
third party cover is provided in the policy (with the exception of the eight “matters” 
specified in s. 148 RTA88). Consequently, where the insurance policy restricts the use 
of the vehicle to social and domestic purposes only, it correspondingly does not provide 
contractual cover where the vehicle is used for commercial purposes. Section 150 
provides that a policy restricted to social, domestic and non-commercial use will 
however cover a fare paying passenger if criteria are met. This has led to a series of 
unfortunate incidents, and required the national courts to be creative in ensuring the 
protection of the third party when s. 150 RTA88 was breached.100 Again, the MVIDs, 
as part of their broad social policy remit, requires for the protection of passengers and 
third-party victims, and that they be compensated according to comprehensive 
application of the MVIDs.101 
                                                        
claims against the insurer on a contractual basis. Art. 75 insurers have no liability to meet subrogated 
claims (a subrogated claim is one where another party should have been responsible for settling) and, as 
demonstrated in EUI the distinction between the rights guaranteed under statute and those available under 
the UDA are sufficiently different to place victims seeking redress under the latter arrangement at a 
disadvantage. 
100 See for instance Seddon v Binions [1978] RTR 163 and Keeley v Pashen [2004] EWCA Civ 1491. 
101 As noted in Churchill v Wilkinson [2012] EWCA Civ 1166 and Case C-409/11 Csonka v Magyar 
Allam [2013] EUECJ (11 July 2013). 
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A conundrum exists between RTA88 s.151(5),102 which obliges the insurer to fulfil the 
coverage required under a policy of motor insurance, regardless of a breach by the 
policyholder, and s. 151(8), providing the insurer with a right to recover sums paid out 
to the third party victim under the policy from the policyholder.103 The interaction 
between these sections of the RTA88, and the breach of the MVIDs, was demonstrated 
in Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson and Tracey Evans.104 The victim was also the 
policyholder and subject to the insurer’s award of compensatory payments as a result 
of the accident (s. 151(5)). She was also subject to a clawback of the award under s. 
151(8). It is in the automatic application of s. 151(5) where the statutory provision 
breaches Art. 13 of the sixth MVID. Given that the drafting of RTA88 included the 
coexistence and application of these sections for the protection of insurers, the Brexit 
result would enable a decision based purely on English law, and there would be no 
further need (requirement or indeed availability), as occurred here, for a reference to 
the CJEU to assist in the consistent interpretation of national law with an EU parent 
directive. How far post-Brexit judicial interpretation would follow previous case law 
determined in conformity with the MVIDs, and how many decisions would be made 
exclusively on the basis of national legislative instruments is difficult to determine at 
                                                        
102 Section 151 RTA88, which imposes the duty on insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured 
or secured against third party risks, is qualified against s.152 RTA88. Section 152 RTA88 outlines 
exclusions from liability and imposes procedural obstacles prior to the insurer being liable for any sum 
awarded. 
103 In the event that he caused or permitted the use of the vehicle which gave rise to the liability. 
104 Case C-442/10 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans v 
Equity Claims Limited [2011] ECR I-00000. 
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present. It will be interesting (if not also adding a further element of unwanted 
uncertainty) to see whether courts, free from the requirement of exercising a purposive 
statutory interpretation, will continue to follow the orthodoxy already established in 
statutory interpretation. The RTA88, at s. 151(4) breaches the MVIDs by imposing 
what is termed “constructive knowledge” on a third party victim of a motor vehicle 
accident. Here motor insurers may exclude liability  
 
“in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, or damage to the property of any 
person who, at the time of the use which gave rise to the liability, was allowing 
himself to be carried in or upon the vehicle and knew or had reason to believe 
that the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken” (authors’ emphasis).  
 
The MVIDs require that insurers, seeking to exclude liability to third party victims, 
prove knowledge rather than impose it constructively through the wording “had reason 
to believe.” National courts continue to interpret the wording of the statute giving effect 
to constructive knowledge,105 and even where the CJEU has held contrary to this, 
national courts may now ignore its previous rulings as being part of a paradigm of 
compliance with EU law which no longer exists. It is to be hoped that in the negotiation 
stage of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, definitive instruction on this matter will be 
issued to provide much needed certainty on the future application of motor vehicle 
insurance law. In each of the issues outlined above, either the national law (in 
transpositional deficit) or the (incorrect) interpretation of the law provided in national 
courts delivers weaker protection for third party victims than is available through the 
                                                        
105 Found in RTA88 151(4) and UDA 2015 cll 7 and 8. 
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EU directives. 
 
4. CONSEQUENCES FOR ENFORCEMENT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
EQUIVALENCE 
 
A “hard” Brexit would remove the areas of breach outlined above. As the conflicts 
between national and EU law occur on the basis of non-transposition and incorrect 
interpretation, by “converting” all EU law currently transposed into national law, such 
problems would be removed. The UK would also be free to establish agreements with 
the MIB on the terms of its choosing. Until this happens (not expected to be concluded 
before the end of 2019), the UK is obliged to give effect to EU law and its rights and 
protections afforded to individuals in member states. 
 
The CJEU respects the national procedural law of member states and seeks to have as 
little interference with their operation as possible. Of course, this approach must be 
tempered with regard to legitimate expectations and the underlying principle of primacy 
through which the EU operates and is underpinned through effectiveness 106  and 
equivalence (as articulated in Rewe). 107  In relation specifically to the equivalence 
                                                        
106 The principle establishes a worthy and appropriate ideal, nonetheless it is in its application that the 
state gains an advantage for internal systems which may fall short of “complete” effectiveness, yet will 
not breach EU law. The test is that the national law or provision does not render it impossible or 
excessively difficult in practice to access the right. Even with the current deficiencies, it could be argued 
that the collectively the RTA88, UDA 2015 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003 (as amended) 
satisfy this broad objective. 
107 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland 
[1976] ECR 1989 at [5].  
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between national law (here the MIB agreements) and the sixth MVID, it was in 
Carswell v Secretary of State for Transport and MIB108 where the High Court held109 
that equivalence does not require a perfect copy of the national civil procedures. Whilst 
true, the CJEU has also repeated on several occasions that “measures liable to seriously 
compromise the attainment of the result proscribed by [a] directive” 110  are to be 
prohibited, and if the disconnect between the EU law and the implementing national 
law is sufficiently significant, national judges have not merely the power, but the duty, 
to set aside the offending national provisions. 111  Similar conclusions as to 
transpositional measures which “constitute a substantial procedural defect, render a 
technical regulation adopted in breach [of either the articles of the directive in question] 
inapplicable.”112   
 
Further, the CJEU allow member states to determine their own procedural rules when 
applying / providing access to EU rules, insofar as they correspond with principles of 
EU law. Ultimately, the onus is placed on member states to ensure that the EU rights 
of individuals are safeguarded at a national level. However, such a simple premise is 
frequently lost in the complexity of national provisions and requires the invoking of the 
                                                        
108 [2010] EWHC 3230 (QB). 
109 at [15-18]. 
110 Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région Wallonne [1997] ECR I/7411. 
111 Case C-555/07 [2010] Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG ECLI:EU:C:2010:21.  
112 Case C-443/98 Unilever Italia SpA v Central Food SpA [2010] ECR I-7535 at [50]. 
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primacy of EU law113 to ensure conflicting national provisions are set aside.114 For 
example, it will be remembered that Mangold115 and Kücükdeveci116 impose on the 
national courts of member states powers to disapply conflicting national legislation 
(this in relation to anti-discrimination law amounting to a general principle of EU law). 
In other respects, where a national court was faced with conflicting EU and national 
law, and no consistent interpretation was possible without adopting a contra legem 
interpretation, the domestic court would apply the national law.117 Beyond this position, 
providing a consistent interpretation of EU law, first established in Marleasing,118 has 
progressed to impose this binding duty on all the authorities of member states 
(including their courts).119 In Pfeiffer,120 the CJEU held national courts must operate 
                                                        
113 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 and Case 
C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] 
ECR I-2433. 
114 In R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1990] UKHL 13, famously the 
requirement of injunctive relief to prevent the application of incompatible national legislation was 
required of “any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of 
Community law” at [20]. However, in Joined Cases 10/97 and 22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN. CO. 
GE/90 Srl and Others [1998] ECR I-6307, the CJEU preferred the rendering of the national provision as 
inapplicable.  
115 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
116 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG Judgment of 19 January 2010. 
117 Case C-334/92 Miret v Fondo de Garantia Salarial [1995] 2 CMLR 49. 
118 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECJ. 
119 Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut 
eV [2004] ECR I-8835. 
120 Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Walshut 
eV [2004] ECR I-8835. 
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under the presumption that the “member state… intended entirely to fulfil the 
obligations arising from the directive concerned.”121 
 
In relation to the MVIDs, whilst their remit has expanded during the development of 
the directives, the first MVID was enacted to facilitate the free movement of persons 
and goods (similarly a general principle of EU law). The third MVID122 has been held 
in Farrell v Whitty123 to be directly effective, and it could be argued that if given this 
interpretation, the national courts would be required to follow the Mangold124 and 
Kücükdeveci125 authorities and disapply conflicting principles contained in the RTA88, 
the UDA 2015 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement (UtDA) 2003 (as amended). Had 
the government intended to negotiate Brexit on the basis of maintaining access to the 
Single Market, this would have required adherence to the free movement principles 
upon which it is based and the MVIDs would have continued in force (even following 
a review of existing legislation as part of the powers expected to be contained in the 
Great Repeal Bill). It would have also been difficult for the UK to restrict the 
obligations to provide effectiveness and equivalence of EU law when these sources 
would have continued to be part of the national legal system. 
 
However, it appears the current approach taken by the government will see the end of 
each of these requirements and impositions. With the removal of the free movement 
                                                        
121 at [119]. 
122 Council Directive 90/232. 
123 Case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty [2007] ECR I-3067. 
124 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
125 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG Judgment of 19 January 2010. 
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principles, 126  the UK will be free of the requirements to provide enforcement 
mechanisms to challenge the state for losses associated with breach of EU law. That 
enforcement, so linked with legal certainty in relation to the application of directives 
where the national law lacks clarity, precision and an unequivocal legal framework,127 
is removed and will greatly reduce individuals’ ability to hold the state to account.128 
Despite a general lack of effectiveness of state liability since Francovich,129 in motor 
insurance the success of several cases130 has demonstrated not only the sufficiently 
serious nature of the UK’s transgressions,131 but also how such cases can highlight the 
breaches and compel changes in the conflicting law.132 The UK’s procedural rules will 
be able to continue the application of harsh strike-out provisions replete in the UDA133 
and UtDA 2003 (as amended).134 By subsuming EU based law into the national law, 
                                                        
126  Enshrined in the fundamental premise of free movement of people and largely equated with 
immigration (but frequently (and incorrectly) conflated with the migrant crises in the Middle East). 
127 Case C-87/14 European Commission v Ireland [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:449 at [41]. 
128 James Marson and Katy Ferris “Collective Redress: Broadening EU Enforcement Through State 
Liability?” (2016) 27 European Business Law Review 3, 325. 
129 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
130 Moore v Byrne v Secretary of State for Transport & MIB [2007] EWHC 879 (QB); Secretary of State 
for Transport & MIB [2008] EWCA Civ 574; Carswell v Secretary of State for Transport & MIB [2010] 
EWHC; and Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
131 Going beyond mere technical breaches. 
132 Nicholas Bevan “No Through Road” (2015) 165 New Law Journal 7648, 7. 
133 For example, see cll 12-13 UDA 2015; cll 7-12 in UDA 1999. 
134 See for instance cl 2 which imposes a binding authority on the representatives of child / mentally 
incapacitated claimants to conclude agreements as if these claimants had capacity. This disadvantages 
the claimant compared with protections available under the Civil Procedure rules. See Nicholas Bevan 
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comparisons with an EU parent directive will be voided as will the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, and the powers derived from Mangold 135  and 
Kücükdeveci136 will be lost in the ability to review primary legislation.  
 
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
It must be remembered that, at the time of writing and until the UK formally exits the 
EU (on Brexit day when the Great Repeal Bill commences), the MVIDs and the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU have primacy over national law. They oblige the UK to not 
only transpose any new provisions of these sources of law, but they also inform the 
scope and application of the UK’s statutory and extra-statutory provisions relating to 
motor vehicle insurance. That is the theory and underlying acquis on which the EU is 
based. Brexit seems likely to change this relationship and revert the UK back to its pre-
1973 legal position. Despite the MVIDs becoming fully national law following the 
enactment of the Great Repeal Bill, given the history of the conflict between national 
and EU law on the matter of motor vehicle insurance, the reluctance of the Secretary of 
State to admit to problems with the transposition of the MVIDs and the rulings of the 
CJEU, and the liability being imposed on the State for the consequences of its breaches 
of EU law, it is probable that offending aspects of the (EU-based) law will be removed. 
The parts of the MVIDs which are currently missing from national law are unlikely to 
be transposed prior to Brexit. This will have negative consequences for those innocent 
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third party victims of negligent and uninsured / untraced drivers. Decades of previous 
case law advancing the rights of victims will be put in jeopardy. As noted above, much 
statutory interpretation, from the higher courts in particular, has been based on a 
purposive/teleological method, and this incorporates both reference to EU law in the 
form of the MVIDs and the interpretations provided by the CJEU. The changes to the 
wording of the RTA88, and interpretation provided by the judiciary (both domestically 
and by the CJEU) are embedded and entwined with national law. To separate EU law 
from the RTA88 would likely necessitate a new Act and a comprehensive review of 
existing laws and liaison with interested parties (in particular the insurance industry 
which has such a marked impact on the UDA and UtDA). Existing restrictions on 
executive discretion and reviews of the agreements concluded between the Secretary of 
State and the MIB will no longer be subject to external scrutiny (and enforceable 
correction). Brexit will certainly facilitate the continuation of a conservative, austerity-
based ethos to prevail which will lead to contractual relationships being the primary 
source of protection with the state being a begrudging and reluctant safety net. 
 
Beyond these fundamental principles being changed, practical problems will also be 
created. A “hard” Brexit will require individuals based in the UK driving to the EU (or 
even simply visiting and being involved in a vehicular accident) to have in place 
bespoke insurance cover. They will be unable to rely on an (EU regulated) central 
guarantee fund body facilitating their claim for compensation for accidents occurring 
in another member state.137 Such contractual relationships will change. Currently, the 
MVIDs provide a comprehensive and inclusive package of safety features and 
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guarantees regarding social policy requirements for victims of accidents. The national 
law, conversely, offers restricted cover and the application of permissible contractual 
exclusions. The fourth MVID138 enabled extensive provision for cross border claims 
and direct rights of action which are also likely to be lost following Brexit.  
 
Brexit may mean Brexit, but it marks a fundamental shift in the rights of third party 
victims of negligent driving and the development of statutory protections. Given the 
disparity between the UK and the EU in this area, this does not bode well for the 
protective rights currently accessible to injured motorists, passengers and pedestrians.  
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